The Class Action Dilemma:  The Certification of Classes Seeking Equitable Relief and Monetary Damages After Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown by Restieri, Jr., Lawrence J.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 63 Issue 5 Article 18 
1995 
The Class Action Dilemma: The Certification of Classes Seeking 
Equitable Relief and Monetary Damages After Ticor Title 
Insurance Co. v. Brown 
Lawrence J. Restieri, Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lawrence J. Restieri, Jr., The Class Action Dilemma: The Certification of Classes Seeking Equitable Relief 
and Monetary Damages After Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1745 (1995). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol63/iss5/18 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
The Class Action Dilemma: The Certification of Classes Seeking Equitable Relief 
and Monetary Damages After Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown 
Cover Page Footnote 
I would like to thank Professor Matthew Diller of Fordham University School of Law for his advice, 
encouragement, and guidance throughout the preparation of this Note. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol63/iss5/18 
THE CLASS ACMON DILEMMA: THE CERTIFICATION OF
CLASSES SEEKING EQUITABLE RELIEF AND
MONETARY DAMAGES AFTER TICOR
TITLE INSURANCE CO. v.
BROBW
LAWRENCE J. RESTIERI, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
When the Advisory Committee rewrote Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23 in 1966, they sought to create a procedural device that could
manage those situations that "naturally" or "necessarily" demand
class-action treatment.' As one member of the Committee stated
shortly after the promulgation of the Rule, "Approaching Rule 23,...
the Committee strove to sort out the factual situations or patterns that
had recurred in class actions and appeared with varying degrees of
convincingness to justify treatment of the class in solido."? Rule 23(b)
is thus divided into three categories under which a class may be certi-
fied,3 each indicative of functional occasions where class-action treat-
* I would like to thank Professor Matthew Diller of Fordham University School
of Law for his advice, encouragement, and guidance throughout the preparation of
this Note.
1. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee" 1966 Amend-
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 Harv. L Rev. 356, 386 (1967)
(commenting on the Advisory Committee's work in formulating the 1966 amendment
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23). Professor Kaplan was a reporter to the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, the committee that framed the current version of Rule 23, from 1960 to
1966. He subsequently became a member of the Advisory Committee. Id. at 356.
2. Id. at 386.
3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) states:
Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications
with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incom-
patible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudi-
cations with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not par-
ties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gen-
erally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to
the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced
by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
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ment is appropriate.4
Under Rules 23(b)(1) and (2), a class action is appropriate when
claims require a single adjudication, for example, when individual
suits by class members would produce incongruous results, or when a
party has acted in a manner generally applicable to an entire class.5
Classes certified under these subdivisions often seek some form of eq-
uitable relief, such as an injunction or a declaratory judgment.6 In
actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3), on the other hand, "class-action
treatment is not as clearly called for as in [Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) ac-
tions], but it may nevertheless be convenient and desirable depending
upon the particular facts. ' '7 Rule 23(b)(3) classes typically seek some
form of damage remedy.8 Because actions certified under 23(b)(3) do
not as readily require a unitary adjudication as do those under (b)(1)
or (2), the Rule allows class members of (b)(3) actions to exclude
themselves from a suit so they may pursue individual litigations.9
Members of (b)(1) and (2) classes are not provided with this opportu-
nity to "opt out" and are bound by a judgment for or against the
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
4. See Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg On Class Actions § 4.01, at 4-4
(1992).
5. See infra part II.B.
6. See, e.g., National Treasury Employment Union v. Reagan, 509 F. Supp. 1337,
1340-41 (D.D.C. 1981) (certifying class conditionally under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) that
sought injunctive and declaratory relief against hiring freeze); Robertson v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (certifying class of basketball
players under Rule 23(b)(1) that sought injunction to prevent rival leagues from
merging), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
8. See, e.g., Durrett v. John Deere Co., 150 F.R.D. 555, 563 (N.D. Tex. 1993)
(certifying class of purchasers of recreational vehicles and boats seeking common law
and statutory punitive damages under Rule 23(b)(3) in suit against lender who fi-
nanced purchases using same form contract).
9. Class members of (b)(3) suits are provided with an opt-out opportunity by
Rule 23(c)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a
specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through
counsel.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). In commenting on the need for this notice and opt-out provi-
sion, the Advisory Committee stated that in (b)(3) actions, "the interests of the indi-
viduals in pursuing their own litigations may be so strong here as to warrant denial of
a class action altogether. Even when a class action is maintained under subdivision
(b)(3), this individual interest is respected." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) advisory commit-
tee's note to 1966 amendment.
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class.10
Because members of classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3) have the
opportunity to opt out of a suit and members of (b)(1) and (2) classes
do not have this option, a proper determination by a court of a class'
certification is essential both for the protection of the right of individ-
ual class members to pursue their own litigations and for the ability of
the court to issue a complete decree. If a class that should be certified
under Rule 23(b)(3) is improperly certified under (b)(1) or (2), then
absent class members will be bound by a judgment from which they
should have had an opportunity to exclude themselves, whereas if a
class that should be certified under Rules 23(b)(1) or (2) is certified
under subdivision (b)(3), an action that requires a single adjudication
may never be completely resolved, because class members can opt out
of the suit and relitigate their individual claims in another court.
Proper certification of a class, however, has proven to be particu-
larly problematic with classes that seek both equitable relief and mon-
etary damages. Because classes seeking equitable relief are typically
certified under (b)(1) or (2) and those seeking damages are normally
certified under (b)(3), classes seeking both forms of relief do not fit
easily into the paradigmatic class categories. To determine how such
classes should be certified, many courts have employed a "predomi-
nance" test."' The predominance test considers which type of relief is
the primary one sought. If the equitable relief is the primary one
sought, then certification under (b)(1) or (2) is proper. Any damage
claim can thus be considered "incidental" or "ancillary" to the equita-
ble relief. If damages, on the other hand, are the primary relief
sought, then the class is certified under (b)(3). 12 Use of this predomi-
10. See Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 4.01, at 4-6 (explaining the differences
between class categories).
11. Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 4.14, at 4-49. See, e.g., Lloyd v. City of
Phila., 121 F.RtD. 246, 251 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (certifying class under 23(b)(2) because
predominant remedy was declaratory and injunctive in suit challenging compulsory
union membership); Duran v. Credit Bureau of Yuma, Inc., 93 F.RID. 607, 609 (D.
Ariz. 1982) (certifying class under Rule 23(b)(3) because predominant reason for ac-
tion was recovery of damages in suit brought for violations of Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692).
It should be noted that the "predominance" test that this Note discusses concerns
the certification test courts have invoked to determine the primary relief a class seeks.
Another "predominance" test is commonly used solely in (b)(3) actions to determine
whether common questions of law or fact "predominate." This Note does not discuss
the latter test.
12. Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 4.14, at 4-48. Compare Probe v. State
Teachers' Retirement Sys., 780 F.2d 776,780 (9th Cir.) (holding that plaintiffs' request
for money damages was incidental to primary claim for injunctive relief to prohibit
use of sex-based mortality tables; class certified under 23(b)(2)), cert denied, 476 U.S.
1170 (1986) and Parker v. Local Union No. 1466, United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-
CIO, 642 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (finding that in action under the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401, awards of puni-
tive, compensatory, and nominal class damages not precluded for class certified under
23(b)(2), because primary relief sought was equitable) with Walsh v. Ford Motor Co..
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nance test, however, has resulted in considerable confusion. As one
commentator stated: "Because the predominance test.., is depen-
dent on the exercise of sound discretion by the court, there is little
doubt that reasonable courts can and do reach opposite results under
similar circumstances."' 3 The class actions at issue in Ticor Title In-
surance Co. v. Brown14 evidence the problems caused by classes seek-
ing both equitable relief and monetary damages.
The class in Ticor was originally certified in 1986.15 The Federal
Trade Commission had brought charges against six title insurance
companies ("Ticor") 16 for conspiring to fix prices on policies in thir-
teen states, including Arizona and Wisconsin.17 As a result, affected
private parties initiated twelve different "tag-along" antitrust class ac-
tions in five district courts in four states.'8 The classes sought treble
damages and injunctive relief.'9 The actions were consolidated as
Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") No. 633 in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.20 After an intervening Supreme Court decision weak-
ened the plaintiffs' claims,"' the class representatives dropped the
damages portion of their claim and agreed to a settlement offer
whereby the class was awarded injunctive relief, increased coverage
130 F.R.D. 260, 266-67 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that in automobile warranty action,
Rule 23(b)(3) certification was proper because money damages would provide more
adequate relief than would injunction) and Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 113
F.R.D. 579, 583 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding that in securities fraud action, relief sought
was predominantly monetary and not injunctive; therefore, Rule 23(b)(2) certification
would be improper).
13. Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 4.14, at 4-49.
14. 114 S. Ct. 1359, 1364 (1994) (per curiam).
15. Id at 1360-61.
16. The Court and this Note refer to all defendants as Ticor.
17. Ticor, 114 S. Ct. at 1360; see infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (explain-
ing the significance of the States of Arizona and Wisconsin in the Ticor litigation).
18. Ticor, 114 S. Ct. at 1360.
19. Id
20. Iat at 1360. The private suits were consolidated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(1988). Id.
21. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S.
48 (1985). The Southern Motor Carriers decision substantially redefined the "state
action doctrine," which was one of Ticor's defenses. The state action doctrine pre-
vents the imposition of antitrust liability for activities that were conducted pursuant to
state law. Ticor claimed that they had acted under state authority. After the Southern
Motor Carriers decision, the FTC dropped charges against Ticor for their activities in
seven of the thirteen affected states. The FTC, however, did not drop its claims
against Ticor in the six remaining states, which included Arizona and Wisconsin. The
FTC contended that those six states did not actively supervise Ticor's alleged price
fixing, and therefore, the state action defense did not apply in those states. The Penn-
sylvania district court conducting the MDL No. 633 litigation, however, found the
Southern Motor Carriers decision "possibly dispositive" on the Ticor litigation, and
consequently, approved the settlement agreement. In re Real Estate Title and Settle-
ment Servs. Antitrust Litig., 1986-ITrade Cas. (CCH) 67,149 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (the
original district court opinion in the Ticor litigation), aff'd, 815 F.2d 695 (3d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 909 (1988).
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on title insurance, and attorney's fees. 2 The district court certified
the settlement class under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2), thus binding the class to the terms of the
settlement.23
The States of Arizona and Wisconsin objected to the class certifica-
tion under the settlement agreement because it bound them despite
their request for money damages: the settlement included only in-
junctive relief and attorney's fees.24 The State of Wisconsin claimed
the action could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because the re-
lief sought was primarily monetary and not injunctive, and both states
claimed that due process required that class members be given the
opportunity to opt out of the suit.25 Over these objections, the district
court approved the settlement and certified the class under the "no
opt out" subdivisions of (b)(1)(A) and (b)(2). 6 The Third Circuit af-
firmed the district court's certification of the class without opinion,
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.27
The case, however, did not end with the certiorari denial. In 1990,
representatives of Arizona and Wisconsin title insurance consumers-
the same plaintiffs who objected to the original settlement-brought
an action against Ticor in federal district court in Arizona for Ticor's
alleged price fixing. As in 1986, the class sought relief in the form of
damages, attorney's fees, and an injunction. Ticor moved for sum-
mary judgment on all claims, based on res judicata, citing the settle-
ment that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania approved in the prior
action. The Arizona district court granted Ticor's motion. The Ninth
Circuit, however, reversed. 8
22. T'tcor, 114 S. Ct. at 1360-61.
23. Subdivision (c)(3) of Rule 23 provides that judgments in any class action are
binding on the class members that the court includes in the class, except for those
members of (b)(3) classes who opt out of the suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). Subdivi-
sion (c)(3) states:
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and de-
scribe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment
in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or
not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to
whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have
not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
24. The States of Arizona and Wisconsin objected to the settlement both as class
members and as parens patriae for the class member residents of each state. Ticor, 114
S. Ct. at 1361.
25. Id at 1361.
26. In re Real Estate Title and Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 1986-1 Trade
Cas. (CCII) '1 67,149 (E.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 909 (1988).
27. In re Real Estate Title and Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 815 F.2d 695 (3d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 909 (1988).
28. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F2d 386, 387 (9th Cir. 1992).
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The Ninth Circuit distinguished between the types of relief sought
by the class. The court held that res judicata applied as to the injunc-
tion, but not as to the damage claims.29 Res judicata, the court held,
did not apply to the damage claims because class members had been
denied due process. 30 According to longstanding precedent, the rules
of res judicata do not apply if due process has been denied.3 Due
process entitles individuals to notice and a hearing before they lose
their rights.32 According to recent precedent involving class actions,
due process requires that absent class plaintiffs be afforded the oppor-
tunity to opt out of suits primarily for monetary damages.33 The
Ninth Circuit characterized the plaintiff class in the original MDL No.
633 litigation as seeking substantial damages; however, class members
had not been given the opportunity to opt out of the suit because,
under the settlement, the class had been certified under Rules
23(b)(1) and (2). Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "there would
be a violation of minimal due process if [the plaintiff class'] damage
claims were held barred by res judicata.' 4 Ticor appealed to the
Supreme Court.
The Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether due
process requires that absent class plaintiffs be given the opportunity to
opt out of any class action seeking money damages. Subsequently,
however, the Court dismissed the writ as improvidently granted on the
ground that there was a possibility that the issue could be resolved by
the provisions of Rule 23 itself, rather than by the Constitution.3 5
Subdivision (c)(2) of Rule 23 mandates that absent members of
classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3) be provided with notice and the
opportunity to be excluded from the suit.36 Absent members of
classes certified under Rules 23(b)(1) or (2) are not granted this notice
and opt-out opportunity.37 The Court suggested that if classes seeking
monetary damages could be certified only under Rule 23(b)(3) and
not under Rules 23(b)(1) or (2), which the Court stated was at least a
"substantial possibility," then the constitutional question would be "of
no general consequence. ' 38 The notice and opt-out provisions re-
quired by the Rule for (b)(3) actions would satisfy due process. The
original certification of the class under (b)(1) and (2), however, was
not subject to the appeal;39 the Court, therefore, dismissed the writ as
29. Id
30. Id at 390.
31. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
32. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
33. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); see also infra part
III.C (discussing the Shutts decision).
34. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992).
35. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 114 S. Ct. 1359, 1360 (1994).
36. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); see supra note 9.
37. See infra parts II and m.
38. Ticor, 114 S. Ct. at 1361.
39. Id at 1361-62. Because the certification of the class had been finally decided
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improvidently granted rather than trying to resolve issues not properly
before it.°
Even though the Supreme Court in Ticor did not conclusively de-
cide the certified constitutional issue raised on appeal, the Court
posed a nonconstitutional question and suggested its answer when it
stated that there is a "substantial possibility"'" that classes seeking
monetary damages can be certified only under Rule 23(b)(3). This
suggested interpretation of Rule 23 is suprising because prior to icor
both courts and commentators generally agreed that in at least some
circumstances, classes seeking both equitable relief and monetary
damages-in some cases quite substantial damages-could be certi-
fied under Rules 23(b)(1) and (2).42 If, after Ticor, classes that would
have been certified under (b)(1) or (2) now must be certified under
(b)(3) simply because of a claim for damages, these classes will have
to shoulder the costs of notifying all identifiable class members of the
suit at an early stage in the litigation because of the notice require-
ment imposed by the Rule on 23(b)(3) classes. In effect, this will pre-
clude many types of suits that have utilized the class action as a means
of redress, particularly suits in the civil rights and employment bene-
fits areas where the class is large, the availability of funds is minimal,
and the damages sought are incidental to the request for injunctive
relief. Moreover, because class members would be allowed to opt out
of what was formerly a (b)(1) or (b)(2) suit, the complete adjudication
a court could once issue now could be defeated by class members who
relitigate the same issues in a different court.
This Note contends that classes fulfilling the requirements of Rules
23(b)(1) or (2) should be certified under the applicable subsection de-
spite the presence of a monetary claim. Requiring classes seeking
both equitable relief and money damages to be certified under Rule
23(b)(3) solely because of the presence of a monetary claim places too
much significance on the relief sought and not enough weight on the
equitable considerations of the class action. This Note proposes a new
test for determining the certification of classes where both equitable
relief and monetary damages are sought. Rather than using a "pre-
dominance" test that weighs the relief sought, a "unity" test, derived
in the MDL No. 633 litigation in 1986 and the Supreme Court declined review of that
certification, res judicata barred relitigation of the certification issue. The Court
stated: "It was conclusively determined in the [original] litigation that respondents'
class fit within Rules 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2); even though that determination may
have been wrong, it is conclusive upon these parties .... " l
40. 1& at 1362.
41. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
42. See Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 4.14 (citing over 50 courts that have
certified classes under Rule 23(b)(2) despite the existence of monetary damages); 7A
Charles A. Wright et aL, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1775 (1986 & Supp. 1994)
[hereinafter Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure] (citing lower court decisions




from the purposes of the class action and Rule 23 itself, should be
employed. A unity test asks whether a class' claim calls for a unitary
adjudication. If an affirmative answer is given, then certification
under (b)(1) or (2) is proper; if a negative answer is given, then (b)(3)
certification is appropriate. Such a test more accurately accounts for
the equities of the class action, allowing claims that require unitary
adjudication to be certified under the appropriate subdivision despite
the existence of a monetary claim. This test also ensures that the due
process rights of absent class members are protected through the class
representative. 43 Additionally, a unity test is simpler than the pre-
dominance test for judges to apply, because a unity test relies more on
the nature of the claim rather than on factors a court must balance.
To illustrate that a unity test is more consistent with the principles
behind the class-action device and Rule 23 than is either the predomi-
nance test or a test that automatically certifies classes seeking money
damages under (b)(3), this Note takes an elementary look at the class
action. By examining its history and purposes, this Note demonstrates
that the concept of unity underlies the class-action device and that a
unity test achieves the device's purpose of class-wide adjudication.
Part I presents a background of the equitable considerations underly-
ing the class action. Part II explores the structure of Rule 23 to
demonstrate how the Rule achieves its equitable aims. Part III fo-
cuses on the due process implications of opt-out rights. Finally, part
IV sets forth the basis for a unity test and applies it to different fact
situations to demonstrate how the test functions. This Note concludes
that the certification issues and due process concerns raised in Ticor
can be resolved through a unity test, thus providing an answer to the
issues that Ticor could not properly address.
I. AN INVENTION OF EQUITY
The purposes of the class-action device underlie the basis for a unity
test. Class actions are often said to be "an invention of equity.
44
This is because they were created to fill the practical need for a proce-
dural device so that mere numbers would not disable large groups of
individuals from either enforcing their rights or being held responsible
for their wrongs.45 The equitable principles of class actions, however,
are not limited to providing large groups of people with a means of
legal redress. The principles of consistency, finality, and judicial econ-
omy also play a vital role in the class action. As Justice Story once
commented, a court must be able to join large classes of people so that
it "may be enabled to make a complete decree between the parties,
may prevent future litigation by taking away the necessity of a multi-
43. See infra part III.D.
44. "The class suit was an invention of equity .... " Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
41(1940).
45. Id; see Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
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plicity of suits, and may make it perfectly certain, that no injustice
shall be done."'
Despite their equitable goals, class actions tend to contradict a law-
yer's sense of fundamental fairness.47 Lawyers are trained to be zeal-
ous advocates for the individual rights of their clients. Because courts
in class actions decide the rights of vast numbers of individuals not
before the court, they tend to strike a nerve in lawyers suggesting that
something must be amiss. Therefore, understanding how class actions
function requires a novel approach to legal thinking.4 As one com-
mentator noted, "If we try to think of class suits as A v. B, plus A v. B,
plus A v. B-single cases that have occurred simultaneously-we pro-
ceed on a wrong line of thought.149 Instead, adjudication in class ac-
tions must be conceived on a class-wide rather than on an individual
scale, where the class is essentially a single unit composed of individu-
als who, at least in one relevant aspect of their legal status, are indis-
tinguishable from one another.5 0 If class actions are perceived as
dispensing justice to a class rather than to individuals, the fairness of
the procedural device becomes evident. The class action under Rule
23 is a rather new development in the law; the notion of class-wide
adjudication, on the other hand, has much deeper roots.5 '
The concept of class-wide adjudication finds its ancestry in the rules
of compulsory joinder and in the Bills of Peace issued by the English
Courts of Chancery in the eighteenth century.5 Compulsory joinder
was an invention of equity itself, created to ensure that a court issued
a complete decree. Administrative problems, however, arose when a
court tried to join parties in great numbers. When all parties could
not be effectively joined, none could obtain relief.5 3 Thus, in the
eighteenth century, as a matter of convenience and necessity, the
Chancery courts created Bills of Peace to provide a class of individuals
with a unitary adjudication.-' Representatives could then bring suits
on behalf of others who were similarly situated. The ideal situation
was where the resemblances among class members were strong and
their differences were slight.55 The court could then issue Bills of
Peace, and such decrees would bind an entire class.5 6
The equitable legal notions of English law were eventually adopted
46. West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 721 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 17,424).
47. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Some Problems of Equity 203 (1950).
48. Geoffrey B. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substan-
tve Law, 58 F.R.D. 307, 308 (1973).
49. Id at 310.
50. Id at 309-10.
51. See Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modem Class
Action 24-26 (1987) (dating the origins of class actions back to medieval English law).
52. Chafee, supra note 47, at 201; Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 1.09, at 1-23.
53. Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 1.09, at 1-23.
54. Id
55. Chafee, supra note 47, at 208.
56. Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 1.09, at 1-23.
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in American jurisprudence and statutory law in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries." Compulsory joinder was codified in the
United States under Federal Equity Rule 48 (1842) and in its succes-
sor, Federal Equity Rule 38 (1912).58 These statutes recognized cer-
tain types of class actions. While these actions enabled large groups of
individuals to obtain relief, there was considerable confusion as to the
binding effect of these judgments on absent class plaintiffs.59 For ex-
ample, in 1921, the Supreme Court stated its belief in the desirability
of binding absent class members in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble,6° but in a later case, without citing Ben-Hur, recast some
doubt as to the binding effect of Equity Rule 38.61
Finally, in 1938, class actions were officially codified in the United
States with the enactment of the original Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23, giving certain types of class actions binding effect, thus mak-
ing unitary adjudication possible.62 The Rule created three class
categories: true, hybrid, and spurious, with the former two binding an
entire class. 63 Fitting classes into one of these categories, however,
57. Id at 1-24.
58. Id
59. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 42, § 1751, at 13.
60. 255 U.S. 356 (1921). The Court stated:
If the federal courts are to have the jurisdiction in class suits to which they
are obviously entitled, the decree when rendered must bind all of the class
properly represented. The parties and the subject-matter are within the
court's jurisdiction. It is impossible to name all of the class as parties, where,
as here, its membership is too numerous to bring into court. The subject-
matter included the control and disposition of the funds of a beneficial or-
ganization and was properly cognizable in a court of equity. The parties
bringing the suit truly represented the interested class. If the decree is to be
effective and conflicting judgments are to be avoided all of the class must be
concluded by the decree.
Id. at 367.
61. Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500, 505 (1938).
62. Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 1.09, at 1-25.
63. The Advisory Committee to the 1966 Amendment of Rule 23 summarized the
categories under the old rule as follows:
The categories of class actions in the original rule were defined in terms of
the abstract nature of the rights involved: the so-called "true" category was
defined as involving "joint, common, or secondary rights"; the "hybrid" cate-
gory, as involving "several" rights related to "specific property"; the "spuri-
ous" category, as involving "several" rights affected by a common question
and related to common relief. It was thought that the definitions accurately
described the situations amenable to the class-suit device, and also would
indicate the proper extent of the judgment in each category, which would in
turn help to determine the res judicata effect of the judgment if questioned in
a later action. Thus the judgments in "true" and "hybrid" class actions
would extend to the class (although in somewhat different ways); the judg-
ment in a "spurious" class action would extend only to the parties including
intervenors.... In practice the terms "joint," "common," etc., which were
used as the basis of the Rule 23 classification proved obscure and uncertain.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
CLASS ACTION DILEMMA
immediately became a problem for district court judges.' "True" ac-
tions were sometimes certified as "spurious," and vice versa. More-
over, the spurious class action was little more than a device for
permissive joinder, binding only on the original parties and those who
intervened.' The lack of binding effect permitted nonjoined class
members in spurious actions to take a "wait and see" position; they
could remain outside the litigation and intervene after the merits had
been decided favorably or remain unbound in an adverse ruling.67
Thus, some of the purposes of the class action, like judicial economy
and unitary adjudication, were defeated when unbound class members
could relitigate the same issues in another court. Consequently,
"[u]nder heavy criticism, original Rule 23 was completely rewritten,
and sweeping innovations were introduced with the 1966
amendments."'
In rewriting Rule 23, the Advisory Committee sought to create an
effective, functional procedural device that incorporated the principles
of class-wide adjudication but avoided the difficulties that arose under
the original Rule.69 The original Rule was overly technical and lacked
the ability to bind class members of spurious actions. The Committee
thus sought to "eliminate many of the legalistic but artificial restric-
tions" of the original Rule and "move closer to . . . 'the aims of a
liberal, nontechnical application' of federal procedural rules, rules
that are designed to place before the court the actual substantive is-
sues in the case with the minimum amount of formal procedural re-
strictions needed to ensure fair and orderly proceedings."70
Therefore, the 1966 Rule 23 eliminated the rigid true, hybrid, and
spurious categorizations. The Committee put in their place a rule that
could handle those situations that "naturally" or "necessarily" de-
manded unitary adjudication.71 Additionally, judgments were made
binding on all members that the court included in the class: the new
Rule replaced an opt-in feature with an opt-out rule, thus eliminating
the problem of "wait and see" plaintiffs.' Thus, with the adoption of
the new Rule 23, large groups of individuals were enabled to obtain
64. Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 1.09, at 1-25; Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure, supra note 42, § 1752, at 16.
65. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
66. Id.; Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 1.09, at 1-25 to 1-26; Wright, Federal
Practice and Procedure, supra note 42, § 1752, at 30-31.
67. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 385.
68. Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 1.09, at 1-26.
69. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
70. Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 Geo. L J.
1204, 1204 (1966) (citation omitted in original). Professor Cohn was chairman of the
Committee on Federal Rules and Procedure of the Federal Bar Association. Id.
71. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 386.
72. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
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redress while avoiding the pitfall of duplicative litigation.73
II. Rue 23 TODAY
To enable a court to dispense justice fairly to an entire class, Rule
23 is divided into five subsections: the first two deal with the factors
necessary for the maintenance of a class action, the latter three con-
cern a court's duties in administering the action. A thorough review
of the nuances of Rule 23 is beyond the scope of this Note. Nonethe-
less, an elementary look at the Rule's basic structure illustrates that
the notion of "unity" is inherent in the requirements of Rule 23.
A. Prerequisites for a Class Action
Rule 23(a) provides four prerequisites for bringing a class action.
Briefly stated, they are (1) numerosity, (2) commonality in questions
of law or fact, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation.74
The first two requirements concern the composition of the class; the
latter two concern the class representative.
Although it may seem axiomatic, as an initial matter, there must be
a class.7' The class must be large enough so as to demand class-action
treatment, and the class members must be united in some way so as to
call for a single adjudication. Rules 23(a)(1) and (2) ensure that these
two essentials are met. Under the numerosity requirement, the class
must be so numerous that joining all members of the class would be
impractical under conventional joinder rules. 6 This does not mean
that before an action can be brought every member of the class must
be identified or be identifiable.77 Nor does it mean that any magic
73. See Newberg & Conte, supra note 4, § 1.10, at 1-26 to 1-27. The commentators
state:
By far the most controversial and dramatic innovation of amended Rule 23
is that all class actions which the court determines to be maintainable will
result in a judgment binding on all class members, whether or not the judg-
ment is favorable to the class. This binding effect of a class action judgment
extends to class actions that were formerly known as spurious class actions
under the original rule.
Id.
74. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) states:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
Id.
75. Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure § 16.2, at 726 (2d ed. 1993).
76. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
77. Friedenthal, supra note 75, § 16.2, at 726; Wright, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure, supra note 42, § 1761, at 137.
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number satisfies this requirement.7' Rather, courts have looked to a
variety of factors, ranging from the complexity of the action to the
geographical location of unnamed class members, as potential reasons
for holding conventional joinder impractical.79 To satisfy the com-
monality requirement, questions of law or fact must be common to the
class.80 'This requirement commands that the class must be bound to-
gether in some manner.8 ' The degree to which the class is united
plays a role in determining under which of subsection (b)'s three cate-
gories the class will be certified.' Practicality lies at the heart of the
numerosity and commonality prerequisites. If a large group of indi-
viduals is united by common issues, then class-action treatment may
be appropriate; however, if a conflict can be resolved through individ-
ual suits or the conventional rules of joinder, there is no reason to
burden the court with the administrative workload of the class
action. 3
Practicality, however, is not afforded a higher priority than the
rights of class members:
Because considerations of efficiency and judicial economy have led
to a relaxation in the class action context of the ordinary guarantee
of a right to be present in the courtroom when one's rights or liabili-
ties are adjudicated, courts are especially careful to ensure that the
absent members have a suitable surrogate.8'
Subsection (a)'s latter two prerequisites help ensure that the class rep-
resentative is such a "suitable surrogate." Under the typicality re-
quirement, the class representative's claims or defenses must be
typical of those of the entire class.8s To help ensure that the class
representative has interests and aims in common with the remainder
of the class, the class representative should be a member of the class."
Rule 23 tries to guarantee that this representative will "vigorously
78. "Groups of as many as 350 have been held too small for a class action, while
groups of 25 or more have been held sufficient." Charles A. Wright, Law of Federal
Courts, § 72, at 510 (5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter Wright, Federal Courts]. But see Ar-
thur R. Miller, An Overview of Federal Class Actions: Past, Present, and Future 22-
23 (2d ed. 1977) (stating that classes consisting of over 40 members are usually consid-
ered large enough whereas classes under 25 members are usually considered
inadequate).
79. Friedenthal, supra note 75, § 16.2, at 728.
80. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
81. The commonality prerequisite does not require each class member's claims to
be identical, nor does it require that they have multiple claims in common. To satisfy
subdivision (a)(2), class members need have only one significant claim in common.
Friedenthal, supra note 75, § 16.2, at 728.
82. See infra part ILB.
83. Friedenthal, supra note 75, § 162., at 727-28.
84. Id. at 729-30.
85. Fed. R Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
86. Friedenthal, supra note 75, § 16.2, at 727. Although being a member of the
class is nowhere mentioned within the Rule as a requirement for being a class repre-
sentative, it has been considered an unwritten requirement. Id.
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prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel"87 by its
adequacy of representation requirement in subsection (a)(4). The
adequate representation requirement of Rule 23 is crucial to the due
process analysis of class actions. In Hansberry v. Lee,89 the Supreme
Court stated:
[W]here the interests of those not joined are of the same class as the
interests of those who are, and where it is considered that the latter
fairly represent the former in the prosecution of the litigation of the
issues in which all have a common interest, the court will proceed to
a decree.90
Thus, Hansberry established adequate representation as a cornerstone
of due process protection in class actions.91
While the above requirements are necessary to maintain a class ac-
tion, they are not by themselves sufficient to bring a class action. In
addition, the requirements of one of subsection (b)'s three categories
must be satisfied for a class to be certified.92
B. The Certification of Classes Under Rule 23
Rule 23(b) provides three subdivisions under which a class may be
certified. Each subdivision reflects general types of claims that bring
class members together such that there is a need for a unitary adjudi-
cation. How class members are bound together and the degree to
which this tie demands class-action treatment help determine under
which subdivision a class will be certified.
Rule 23(b)(1) essentially provides for classes where the prosecution
of separate actions would lead to inequitable results either for individ-
ual class members or for the party opposing the class.93 As one of the
framers of the Rule described, the key to Rule 23(b)(1) classes lies in
"the difficulties that could arise if litigations were carried on, one by
one, with individual members of the class. Depending on the circum-
stances, individual litigations will adversely affect either the individual
plaintiffs or the defendant."'94 To account for which party would be
affected by the individual litigations, the class or the party opposing it,
subsection (b)(1) is broken down into two subdivisions. In (b)(1)(A)
actions, the party opposing the class is obligated to treat all class mem-
bers alike, as in the case of an employer whose employment policies
are at issue.95 In (b)(1)(B) actions, individual suits by class members
87. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973).
88. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
89. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
90. IL at 41-42.
91. See infra part II.
92. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
93. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
94. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 388.
95. See White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1408 (D. Minn.
1993) (certifying a class under 23(b)(1)(A) in action challenging the league's employ-
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would be conclusive on the rights of other class members, as in the
instance of a "limited fund," where one action could deplete the re-
sources available for satisfying other class members' suits.
Rule 23(b)(2) is applicable "[w]hen the party opposing a class ha[s]
acted on grounds apparently applying to the whole group." 97 Classes
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) typically consist of plaintiffs seeking re-
lief that is primarily injunctive or declaratory in nature.98 Because an
injunction or declaratory judgment may affect an entire class, there is
often a need for a unitary adjudication. The most common 23(b)(2)
suit involves civil rights actions.99 As one commentator noted: "The
impact of class suits in civil rights cases is substantial. Precedent alone
never has the effect of a judgment naming a particular class of which a
person is a member. Very often, a class action permits the judge to get
to the heart of an institutional problem."" ° While the Advisory Com-
mittee suggested that civil rights cases are appropriate for (b)(2) certi-
fication, the Committee also stated that this "subdivision does not
extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively
or predominantly to money damages."' 0' This statement is the source
of the so-called "predominance" test.
The third and final category under which class actions may be certi-
fied is Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are those in which
common questions of law or fact predominate." The Advisory Com-
mittee notes that this type of class does not as readily call for class-
action treatment as do those certified under Rules 23(b)(1) and (2).
Nevertheless, class-action treatment is permitted because the facts of
the case dictate that a class action is the most desirable procedural
device.10 3 The Rule provides four factors for a court to weigh in de-
ciding whether a case is suitable for certification under (b)(3). 0' The
ment policies, because if individual actions were sought, league would be subject to
incompatible standards of conduct), aff'd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994).
96. See, eg., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d
Cir. 1992) (certifying class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in suit against bankrupt defendant
to preserve defendant's limited resources for reimbursement to all class members).
97. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 389.
98. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
99. See Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1982) (certifying as a
class black employees in an employment discrimination case against bank); Bolton v.
Murray Envelope Corp., 553 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1977) (filing of civil rights suit by black
employee against former employer); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511
(6th Cir. 1976) (certifying class under 23(b)(2) in a Title VII action allowing award of
back pay).
100. Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Ac-
tions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 304 (1973).
101. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
102. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
103. Fed. P. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
104. The Rule states:
The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members
of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the contro-
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prototypical (b)(3) suit concerns numerous plaintiffs with small claims
who bring a class action. The individual claims are so small that it
would not be economical to bring suits individually, but as a class, the
total damage claim makes a suit feasible. 5 Rule 23(b)(3) actions are
particularly suitable to antitrust and securities fraud cases because
such suits often involve many plaintiffs with small claims. 10 6
Because the only element that (b)(3) class members have in com-
mon is the claim, (b)(3) classes are often said to be not as "cohesive"
as those under (b)(1) or (2). 107 As one commentator phrased it,
"There typically is no ongoing association among [the claimants] and
the members often have different remedial objectives.' 8 Because
(b)(3) litigants are less tightly bound together than are (b)(1) or (2)
class members, there is less of a need for a unitary adjudication.
Whereas (b)(1) and (2) class actions seek to bind class members be-
cause of a need for a single adjudication, such as in a suit against a
limited fund or a civil rights case, (b)(3) classes do not have the same
compelling need for a single class-wide adjudication. 10 9 In (b)(3) suits,
"the interests of the individuals in pursuing their own litigations may
be so strong ... as to warrant denial of a class action altogether." 110
Therefore, a key distinction between the class categories is that (b)(1)
and (2) claims litigated separately would create conflicting judgments
whereas individual (b)(3) claims would not produce such incongruity.
Because (b)(3) classes are less "united" and do not demand a "uni-
tary" adjudication, the Advisory Committee incorporated an addi-
tional procedural safeguard to ensure that the interests of members of
(b)(3) classes in pursuing individual litigations are protected: (b)(3)
class members must be provided with notice that the class action con-
cerns them and an opportunity to opt out of the suit."'
C. Management of Class Actions
Subsections (c), (d), and (e) of Rule 23 provide guidelines for a
court in managing a class action. This section highlights only those
versy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desira-
bility or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the manage-
ment of a class action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
105. See, e.g., Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 122 F.R.D.
177 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (certifying action of small securities claims under Rule 23(b)(3)).
106. See, e.g., Ridings v. Canadian Imperial Bank, 94 F.R.D. 147, 150 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (certifying class with small claims arising from securities fraud under 23(b)(3));
Wright, Federal Courts, supra note 78, at 517.
107. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
108. Arthur R. Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313,
315 (1973).
109. See Friedenthal, supra note 75, at 737.
110. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
111. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); Miller, supra note 108, at 315.
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portions of these subsections that relate to the overall fairness of the
class-action device.
Subsection (c) incorporates two major changes to eliminate difficul-
ties that Rule 23 parties experienced between 1938 and 1966. These
alterations relate to the binding effect of (b)(3) actions and to the
rights of absent class members in such suits.' The subsection pro-
vides that (b)(3) actions, which were essentially "spurious" actions
under the old rule, are now binding on absent class members provided
that the members do not exclude themselves from the suit." 3 This
opt-out provision for (b)(3) actions changed the old rule under which
unnamed class members had to "opt in" through intervention." 4 As
mentioned in part I, it was the difficulties with "wait and see" plain-
tiffs that "spurious" actions encouraged that precipitated the Rules
Advisory Committee to revisit Rule 23.15
Rule 23(d) provides an important discretionary tool for district
court judges. Subdivision (d)(2) allows a court to provide notice to
the class even though the Rule does not require notice in all class
actions.'1 6 A limited fund case is an example where notice would be
helpful to class members to allow them to present their individual
damage claims after a class-wide decision regarding liability has been
reached. Courts may also send notice to class members to determine
if any of them oppose the representation or to poll members on a
modification to a consent decree.
The final subsection of Rule 23 requires court approval of any set-
tlement, dismissal, or compromise to the class action. 1 7 Subdivision
(e) is designed to prevent a settlement that is unfair or unjust. Such a
settlement may result either from class representatives not fulfilling
their duty to "vigorously pursue" the class' interest or from collusion
between the plaintiffs' and defendant's lawyers." 8 Neither scenario is
112. See supra note 73.
113. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
114. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
116. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). Subdivision (d)(2), in pertinent part, states:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make
appropriate orders:... (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of
the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given
in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any
step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the op-
portunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation
fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise
to come into the action ....
Id. See Fed. R Civ. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
117. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Subdivision (e) states:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
Id.
118. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action, Wall St. J., Sept. 7,
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desired; therefore, Rule 23 provides an additional safeguard to ensure
that a settlement is fair.
III. Dut PRocEss IN CLASS ACTIONS
Thus far, this Note has attempted to illustrate that the class action is
at its core a fair procedural device and that Rule 23 achieves the class
action's just goals. Yet, no matter how equitable the aims of the class
action, because the class action ultimately decides the rights of un-
named class members not before the court, it raises due process con-
cerns. This section focuses on three seminal Supreme Court cases that
are often cited with regard to the due process rights of absent mem-
bers in class actions: Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,'"9
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,120 and Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.12 l
While all three of these cases addressed legitimate due process con-
cerns, the holdings of these cases are only relevant to classes certified
under Rule 23(b)(3). As the Supreme Court originally stated in Han-
sberry v. Lee:'22 "[T]here has been a failure of due process only in
those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly
insures the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be
bound by it."' 23 The notice and opt-out requirements for Rule
23(b)(3) classes are unnecessary for (b)(1) and (2) classes because
Rule 23 already fairly protects the interests of (b)(1) and (2) class
members representatively.
A. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
Although not a class action, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.'24 is considered the progenitor of the notice requirement.2 5
The case involved the potential effect of a statutorily required ac-
counting by a state court for the beneficiaries of a trust fund.12 6 The
issue before the Court was whether notice in a newspaper was suffi-
cient to bind beneficiaries not before the court.' 27 The Court held
that, at least for the known beneficiaries, due process required indi-
vidual notice by first-class mail.' 28 For the beneficiaries that were un-
1994, at A15 (writing of the problem created by prearranged class actions whereby
defense counsel and a "friendly plaintiffs' attorney" agree to a settlement prior to
filing suit to bind class members and preclude future individual actions).
119. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
120. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
121. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
122. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
123. IL at 42.
124. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
125. See 7B Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 42, § 1786, at 190.
126. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 307 (1950).
127. Id. at 315.
128. Id at 318.
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known, publication in the newspaper might suffice." 9 The Court
stated:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably cal-
culated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to pres-
ent their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reason-
ably to convey the required information, and it must afford a
reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. But
if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case
these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional require-
ments are satisfied.130
The notice provisions of Rule 23 were incorporated to satisfy the due
process requirements established by the Court in Mullane.'
Rule 23 addresses notice in two subsections of the Rule: in subdivi-
sion (d)(2), where notice is encouraged in any type of class action
where the judge deems it appropriate, 132 and in subsection (c)(2),
where notice is required for (b)(3) actions. Rule 23(c)(2) states:
"[T]he court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort. ' 133 In Ei-
sen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,"M the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of what constitutes "the best notice practicable."
B. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
Eisen involved a suit brought by a private investor against two odd-
lot trading firms.135 The firms were charging small fees on all trades
through their virtual monopoly of the market. Morton Eisen, whose
personal stake in the action was under one hundred dollars, brought a
class action against the firms to recoup the fees on behalf of himself
and the other six million odd-lot traders. The class was certified under
23(b)(3). 36 A problem arose in the cost of notifying the absent class
members individually. Postage costs to the two and one-quarter mil-
lion class members already identifiable would total $225,000, whereas
a specialized notification scheme through the New York Stock Ex-
change, commercial banks, and the Wall Street Journal would have
cost only $21,720.137 The district court allowed Eisen to notify class
129. See id. at 317.
130. Id at 314-15 (citations omitted).
131. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), (d)(2) advisory committee's note to 1966
amendment.
132. Fed. R Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
133. Fed. R Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
134. 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974).
135. Id at 160.
136. Id at 160-66.
137. Id at 167.
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members via the latter approach.13 Both the Second Circuit and the
Supreme Court, however, disagreed. 39 The Supreme Court held that
because the names and addresses of the absent class members were
"easily ascertainable," they had to be given individual notice. 40
The Court, however, rested its opinion on the requirements of Rule
23, rather than on the Constitution. 14 1 According to the Court, the
requirements of subdivision (c)(2) dictate that individual notice must
be sent to all identifiable class members, despite the potential costs to
the class representative." 2 Conversely, the Mullane Court held that
due process does not mandate individual notice in all situations; the
"practicalities and peculiarities" of the case can be weighed in deter-
mining adequate notice." 3 By requiring that notice be sent to class
members individually, Eisen established a stricter standard for notice
than was previously required to ensure due process.14  Because the
standard established in Eisen was based on Rule 23(c)(2), its notice
standard applies only to (b)(3) classes.
C. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts
The Supreme Court revisited the due process requirements of no-
tice in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shuttas.5 Shuts involved a suit to
recover the interest on royalty payments of leases owed by the oil
company to a class consisting of some 33,000 royalty owners.' 46 The
forum state sought to bind the class of plaintiffs, which was composed
of residents from a number of different states." 7 The Court held that
the state could bind the plaintiffs only if it provided them with mini-
mal due process. The Court stated:
[W]e hold that due process requires at a minimum that an absent
plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from
the class by executing and returning an "opt out" or "request for
exclusion" form to the court. Finally, the Due Process Clause of
course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately rep-
resent the interests of the absent class members. 148
The Court, however, expressly limited its opinion to those class ac-
138. Id.
139. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1015 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417
U.S. 156, 175 (1974).
140. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 175.
141. Id. at 177 (stating "quite apart from what due process may require, the com-
mand of Rule 23 is clearly to the contrary"); see Friedenthal, supra note 75, § 16.6, at
751.
142. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 176.
143. Mullane v. Central Honover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
144. Friedenthal, supra note 75, § 16.6, at 751.
145. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
146. Id. at 801.
147. Id. at 806.
148. Id. at 812 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43, 45 (1940)).
1764 [Vol. 63
CLASS ACTION DILEMMA
tions with claims "wholly or predominantly for money judgments."1 49
The Court specifically did not extend its holding to class actions
"seeking equitable relief."'1 50 Because of these limitations on the
holding, one commentator stated that Shuns does "not apply to classes
certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2)." 111
D. Notice and Opt-Out Rights in Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) Classes: A
Contradiction of Terms
The aforementioned cases have helped to establish the process that
is due absent members of classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3). The
question of what process is due absent members of (b)(1) and (b)(2)
classes, however, remains undecided. Ticor logically appeared to be
the next case that would decide the due process fights of absent class
members. The Supreme Court, however, decided not to resolve the
issue on constitutional grounds.'5 This is so despite the fact that the
Ninth Circuit dealt specifically with due process considerations in its
Ticor decision. 53 The Ninth Circuit held that the Shuns due process
standard applied to (b)(1) and (2) classes seeking substantial mone-
tary damages,'5 hence requiring that absent members be provided
with a fight to opt out of the suit. Such an opt-out fight, however, is
unnecessary for classes properly certified under (b)(1) or (2).
Whereas notice and the fight to be excluded from a suit are essential
to the fights of individual members of (b)(3) classes to pursue their
own individual litigations, such requirements are unnecessary and
counterproductive in (b)(1) and (2) actions. Due process is instead
satisfied in (b)(1) and (2) actions by the Rule's certification require-
ments rather than by any individual opt-out fight.
As mentioned above, in structuring Rule 23(b), the Advisory Com-
mittee sought to categorize the functional occasions that naturally call
for class-action treatment. 55 In (b)(1) and (2) actions, class-action
treatment is called for because a single adjudication is required to fi-
149. Id. at 811 n.3.
150. Id. at 811-12 n3.
151. Newberg, supra note 4, § 1.19, at 1-47; see also Arthur R. Miller & David
Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Mulitistate Class Actions After Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 Yale L. J. 1 (1986). Miller and Crump comment that the
notice and opt-out requirements of Shutts do not necessarily apply to all (b)(1) and
(b)(2) classes if Shutts is viewed as "a case about distant forum abuse." They state:
The right to opt out is essential to the Supreme Court's inference of consent,
and that reasoning, in turn, is essential to the Court's validation of jurisdic-
tion over members who have no affiliation with a distant forum. If this rea-
soning is accepted, Shutts does not abolish all [Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)]
classes. Instead, it prohibits only those [(b)(1) and (b)(2)] actions that are
brought in inappropriate forums.
Id. at 52.
152. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
154. See Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992).
155. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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nally and uniformly decide the issues common to a class.156 In such
cases, individual suits by class members, the result of class members
opting out, would defeat the finality of a court's decree: in a limited
fund case, an individual claim could deplete the resources necessary to
satisfy other class members' claims,'157 or in an employment discrimi-
nation suit, an employer could be subject to incompatible standards of
conduct if employees filed individual suits.158 Notice and opt-out
rights are unnecessary to satisfy due process in (b)(1) and (2) actions
because in such actions, class members are in so similar a position:
Often each member of a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class would be affected by
a judgment obtained in an individual action instituted by another
member of the class. Moreover, in those classes, there are fewer
special defenses or issues relating to individual class members.
Therefore, it is more likely that the named representatives, by
presenting their own claims, will protect the interests of the absent
members, and the courts need be less concerned about making cer-
tain that each member of the class is given notice and an opportu-
nity to be present.'5 9
The homogenity of claims inherent in (b)(1) and (2) actions, how-
ever, is not present in (b)(3) suits. For example, in a securities fraud
case, a typical (b)(3) action, 6° an individual action by a class member
would not be conclusive on the rights of other class members. This is
because a (b)(3) action is not as natural a candidate for a class action's
unitary adjudication as are (b)(1) and (2) classes.
It is broadly implicit [in (b)(3) actions] that a single determination
by representative parties alone cannot in itself decide the claims or
defenses of all class members; it is assumed that individual questions
peculiar to individual class members, but overweighed by the com-
mon questions, will or may remain after the common questions have
been finally determined.' 6'
In the case of a securities fraud claim, a class member's individual suit
for damages would not affect other claimants because an award would
only affect that particular plaintiff-provided that the case does not
involve a limited fund. Because individual litigations are not conclu-
sive on the rights of other class members, there is no need for a uni-
tary adjudication binding on all class members.
Because classes certified under (b)(3) do not as readily demand
class-action treatment, Rule 23 respects the individual interests of
members of such actions by permitting them to exclude themselves
156. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
158. See infra part IV.A.
159. Friedenthal, supra note 75, § 16.6, at 752.
160. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
161. Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23,
43 F.R.D. 39, 43 (1967).
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from a suit."6 Whereas in Rule 23(b)(3) actions notice and opt-out
rights are necessary to protect the individual interests of class mem-
bers in pursuing their own litigations and thereby satisfy due process,
such procedural safeguards are unnecessary to satisfy due process in
(b)(1) and (2) actions. 63 Due process in (b)(1) and (2) actions is satis-
fied through adequate representation, and any marginal gains from
permitting class members of (b)(1) and (2) classes to opt out of a suit
would be completely outweighed by the "societal costs"'" such safe-
guards would impose: permitting an individual to opt out of a (b)(1)
or (b)(2) suit could completely defeat the court's decree by allowing
claims to be relitigated.165
Because representatives of (b)(1) and (2) classes adequately protect
the due process interests of absent class members, not only are the
due process requirements originally set forth in Hansberry v. Lee'6
satisfied, but the current due process test established by the Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge'6 7 is also satisfied. Briefly stated, the
Mathews test requires the analysis of three factors: (1) the private
interest of the party asserting the claim; (2) the risk that such interest
could be deprived through the proposed procedure and the probable
value of any additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the effect on
the interests of other parties in providing the additional safeguards. 16
In Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) actions, the interest involved is that of absent
162. See supra notes 107-11.
163. See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev.
97, 120 (commenting on notice requirements after Eisen). Professor Dam states:
Res judicata operates against class members, and so they do not benefit di-
rectly. As for defendants, they will not normally place much value on bind-
ing class members. If a defendant loses, the merger effect of res judicata is
usually irrelevant. As for barring further actions by class members, it would
be the rare class member who would attempt to tread the same ground as
the unsuccessful represetative plaintiff. To the extent that class actions are
the result of a lawyer's entrepreneurship, second actions need hardly be
feared, for what entrpreneur would invest time and money in a venture al-
ready demonstrated to be profitless? Since the absent class members would
be asserting claims presumable identical in every substative respect with
those of the represetative plaintiff, the doctrine of stare decisis would apply
in an uncommonly powerful way.
ld.
164. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the marginal gains from affording
an additional procedural safeguard often may be outweighed by the societal cost of
providing such a safeguard." Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473
U.S. 305, 320-21 (1985); see also Newberg, supra note 4, § 1.22, at 1-51 (stating that
the due process rights of class members of Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) classes are ade-
quately protected through representation).
165. For instance, in the case of a limited fund, if individuals were permitted to opt
out of the suit and relitigate, they could obtain a judgment that would deplete the
fund.
166. 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940); see supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
167. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
168. Id. at 335; see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105,2112 (1991) (modify-
ing the test for procedures between private parties).
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class members in pursuing individual actions. As illustrated above,
absent members of (b)(1) and (2) classes are in virtually the identical
position as the named representatives; therefore, because the repre-
sentatives have the same claims and defenses as absent members, anyjudgment against the representatives will be conclusive on the rest of
the class. An additional safeguard of an opt-out right would prove to
be fruitless. Moreover, regarding the third prong of the Mathews test,
an opt-out right could greatly interfere with the rights of class mem-
bers or parties opposing the class, because individual class members
could relitigate claims in other courts. Therefore, whereas notice and
opt-out rights may be necessary procedural safeguards in (b)(3) ac-
tions, they are antithetical to (b)(1) and (2) actions because in (b)(1)
and (2) actions, adequate representation satisfies due process.
IV. A UNITY TEST
When the Supreme Court suggested in Ticor Title Insurance Co. v.
Brown that the constitutional question of what process is due absent
members of (b)(1) and (2) classes could be resolved by Rule 23 it-
self,169 in a manner of speaking, the Court was correct. Due process
may be satisfied through Rule 23's certification requirements. Due
process can be satisfied representatively under Rules 23(b)(1) and (2)
so long as the class is properly certified. Therefore, the key to the
class action dilemma-guaranteeing that the due process rights of ab-
sent members of (b)(1) and (2) classes that seek both equitable relief
and monetary damages are protected while enabling a court to issue
the complete relief a complaint requires-is to ensure that the class is
properly certified.
As mentioned above, the "predominance" test has been the ap-
proach most courts have traditionally used in determining how to cer-
tify classes seeking both equitable relief and money damages. 170 The
problem with the predominance test is that it places too much empha-
sis on the form of relief sought and not enough on the reasons behind
why classes and class claims deserve class-action treatment. Addition-
ally, a balancing test, such as the predominance test, can put the fate
of a class' certification in the hands of the pleader. 171 If a class that
seeks equitable relief and money damages has a skilled lawyer as its
counsel, the class' attorney may be able to tip the scales of the pre-
dominance test in favor of equity and get a class that should have been
certified under Rule 23(b)(3) certified under (b)(1) or (2) by adding
claims for injunctive relief when the class claim is primarily for dam-
ages. Such artful pleading improperly binds class members while
169. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 114 S. Ct. 1359, 1361 (1994).
170. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
171. See American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Report and Recommen-





The class action, the "invention of equity," demands a more equita-
ble test than merely weighing which relief is the primary one sought or
inflexibly forcing claims that include monetary damages to be certified
under Rule 23(b)(3). Because the class action seeks to adjudicate dis-
putes on a class-wide basis, class certification should depend more on
the nature of the claim and the nature of the class than on the form of
the relief sought. A test can be derived from the considerations al-
ready present in the Rule that would allow classes that require binding
class-action treatment to be certified under (b)(1) or (2), but would
prevent absent class members from being improperly bound in a class
that should never have been certified under that subdivison. Such a
test can be termed a "unity" test.
The test requires a court to inquire whether a class' claim calls for a
"unitary" adjudication, a single determination of relief binding on an
entire class. If the nature of the class' claim is such that it requires a
court to issue a single decree, irrespective of whether the relief in-
cludes a damage remedy, then (b)(1) or (2) certification is proper. In
making this determination, a court should consider whether separate
litigations would defeat a court's adjudication or present the defend-
ant with demands for relief that are inconsistent with one another. If
separate litigations would produce such effects, then the class should
be certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2). If separate litigations would
not interfere with the rights of other class members or the party op-
posing the class, then (b)(3) certification is more appropriate because
there is no need for a unitary adjudication. Additionally, a court
should consider whether there is a unity of claims among the class
members; to the degree that a class' claims are united, due process is
more readily satisfied.
An advantage of the unity test is that it coincides with the phrasing
of subsection (b) of Rule 23. Rule 23(b)(1) states that a class action is
appropriate when "the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members" could create "inconsistent or varying adjudica-
tions" for individual class members, could cause "incompatible stan-
dards of conduct of the party opposing the class," or could "as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members"
of the class.17 3 These are all instances of occasions that require a uni-
tary adjudication. Rule 23(b)(2) states that a class action is appropri-
ate when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class." '174 If a party has acted
against a class in a manner that requires a unitary adjudication, then a
court should have the power to issue complete relief to a class, even if
it includes monetary damages, so long as the damages flow from the
172. Id
173. Fed. R Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
174. Fed. R Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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equitable relief.175 When damages flow from the equitable relief, the
damages and the relief are both part of a court's unitary adjudication.
Although subsection (b)(2) states that certification under that sub-
division is appropriate for "final injunctive relief or corresponding de-
claratory relief,"' 76 the Rule does not state that (b)(2) certification is
appropriate whenever injunctive or declaratory relief is sought, nor
does it state that injunctive relief need be binding on an entire class.
The problem that arises with the predominance test is that once a
party pleads for injunctive relief and money damages, a court is put in
the position of having to weigh which relief is the primary one sought,
thus opening the door for reasonable minds to differ.' 77 A unity test,
on the other hand, avoids this difficulty. Rather than asking a court to
look to the relief requested, it asks a court to focus on the overall
nature of the claim and the class to determine the relief required. If a
class' claim calls for a single adjudication that binds all class members,
certification under (b)(1) or (2) is proper regardless of the form of
relief sought, because allowing class members to pursue individual ac-
tions would defeat a court's judgment. Moreover, to the extent that
class members claims are similar, due process is satisfied through ade-
quate representation, thus defeating the need for an opt-out right.
Application of the unity test is simple because it only requires a court
to test whether a class' claim meets certain criteria, a task a court must
already undertake in subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 23.178 Addition-
ally, regardless of whether a court is determining a class' preliminary
certification or approving a settlement, a court can apply the unity test
at any stage of a class action.
Some illustrations of how this unity test operates are helpful in
demonstrating its benefits and its superiority over both the predomi-
nance test and the automatic certification of classes seeking both equi-
table and monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(3).
A. Certification of a Class Seeking Substantial Monetary Damages
Under Rule 23(b) (1)
As an initial illustration, this Note offers as a case study a class that
sought equitable relief and substantial money damages. In the actual
case, the class was certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) despite the pres-
ence of a large monetary claim. This illustration is intended to
demonstrate how the unity test produces fairer results than does auto-
matically certifying classes seeking monetary damages under Rule
23(b)(3).
175. See infra part IV.B (offering an example of damages flowing from equitable
relief).
176. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
177. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
178. See supra part II.A-B.
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In White v. National Football League,179 a class of football players
sued the National Football League, challenging the league's employ-
ment practices. The class sought injunctive as well as substantial mon-
etary relief. The players and the league reached a settlement that
included new terms of employment for the class members and over
$250 million in monetary relief.lm Notice of the settlement was pro-
vided to class members both individually and through newspaper pub-
lication. Although this notice gave unnamed class members an
opportunity to be heard and to object to the settlement, the court de-
nied the motions of objecting players to opt out of the settlement.
The court concluded: "[T]he prosecution of separate actions by indi-
vidual players would create the risk of judgments that may, as a practi-
cal matter, affect the rights of class members and impair their ability
to protect their interests."18' The class was thus certified under Rule23(b)(1)(A) _ 82
If this case were instead certified under the rule-based rationale
suggested by Supreme Court in Ticor, certification under Rule
23(b)(3) would have been necessary because the class sought a sub-
stantial monetary award in addition to equitable relief. Because class
members would have been permitted to opt out of the suit, the com-
plete relief that the court and these parties agreed was a fair and rea-
sonable settlement would have been defeated. Individual players
could relitigate their claims, and the NFL would be faced with incom-
patible standards of conduct because each player could potentially be
subject to a different set of employment rules. "[T]he objective of
both the class and of the NFL to lay a firm foundation for peace for
years to come"s would be subverted through endless relitigation of
the same issues.
If this case were instead certified following a unity analysis, the set-
tlement reached by the parties involved would bind the class and thus
provide a final resolution of the dispute. The class consisted of mem-
bers with an ongoing relationship; they were all professional football
players. Because this relationship helps to ensure that absent mem-
bers' rights are protected representatively, due process concerns are
minimal. Moreover, the class' claim demanded a unitary adjudication:
the final resolution of the conflict required a restructuring of the
NFL's employment practices, and any judgment against a class mem-
179. 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993), aff'd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994).
180. The settlement covered free agency, minimum salaries, the college draft, and
the salary cap, and provided $115 million to be paid to class members, S80 million as
reimbursement costs, $30 million in back pay, $10 million to the NFL Players Associa-
tion, $19 million in settlements of other preexisting cases, and S19 million in attor-
neys' fees. White, 822 F. Supp. at 1413-16.
181. Id. at 1409.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1415.
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ber would affect all class members; hence, a single resolution was
required.
The unity test accounts for the need for finality, without denying
plaintiffs the form of relief they seek. Therefore, under a unity test,
when justice demands that relief be provided that includes equitable
as well as fiscal considerations, a court can provide such relief. If, on
the other hand, classes were to be automatically certified under Rule
23(b)(3) merely because the relief sought included a monetary claim,
a court would be unable to provide the parties with complete relief.
B. Certification of a Class Seeking Equitable Relief and Damages
Under Rule 23(b)(2)
As a second illustration, this Note offers a case where a class
brought suit seeking both injunctive relief and the retroactive pay-
ment of pension benefits. In Jansen v. Greyhound Corp.,184 a class
consisting of 5251 retirees brought suit against their former employ-
ers, Armour and Armour Food Company ("AFC"), under the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act, seeking to clarify the class
members' rights to future benefits and to recover benefits due under
an employee welfare benefit plan.'85 The district court judge certified
the class under Rule 23(b)(2), despite the existence of a monetary
claim.' 86 The district court stated: "The monetary relief requested in
this action involves retroactive payment of welfare benefits to the
class members, as well as costs and attorney fees incurred by the plain-
tiffs in prosecuting this action. Any monetary relief awarded will flow
from the declaratory and injunctive relief requested . .. ."11
If this case were instead certified under Rule 23(b)(3) because the
claim included a request for monetary relief, unnamed class members
would be permitted to opt out of the suit. Regardless of whether any
class members opt out, all class members will be affected by the relief
the court issues. If Armour and AFC must restructure their retire-
ment benefits system, all retirees would be affected by the new pro-
gram because Armour and AFC are obligated to distribute the
pension fund uniformly to their retired employees. Moreover, be-
cause all class members are in virtually an identical position-they are
retirees of the same companies-due process concerns are allayed be-
cause if due process is satisfied as to one claimant, it is naturally satis-
fied as to the absent claimants. Additionally, certifying the class
under Rule 23(b)(3) would only encourage absent class members to
take a "wait and see" position, a posture the Advisory Committee
specifically sought to avoid. 88
184. 692 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Iowa 1986).
185. Id at 1023.
186. Id at 1028.
187. Id
188. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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A unity test, on the other hand, allows the class to be certified
under Rule 23(b)(2). The monetary relief is part of the court's overall
unitary adjudication: the court could not issue complete relief without
including the retroactive welfare benefits. Therefore, under a unity
test, a court is able to issue a complete decree.
C. The Improper Certification of a Class Seeking Equitable Relief
and Monetary Damages
The above illustrations demonstrate that a unity test allows a court
a fuller panoply of remedies than does automatically certifying classes
seeking money damages under Rule 23(b)(3). The courts in White
and Jansen, however, used a predominance test to certify their respec-
tive classes and, concededly, reached a correct result. Although the
predominance test may produce fair results in certain situations, a
unity test is superior because it avoids the contradictory verdicts that
result from courts trying to weigh the relief sought.1 9 As a case study,
this section turns to Tcor.
In the original Ticor litigation, the State of Wisconsin, as a class
member and as parens patriae for its resident class members, objected
to the proposed settlement that was before the district court on the
ground that the relief the class sought was primarily monetary and not
injunctive. Thus, Wisconsin argued, on the basis of the predominance
test, that Rule 23(b)(2) certification was improper.1 9 The district
court rejected the objection and certified the class under (b)(1)(A)
and (b)(2).191 The Third Circuit affirmed this certification.' 92 When
the class relitigated the case in a different court, however, the Ninth
Circuit disagreed with the class certification by holding that the class
was not bound by the judgment. 193 This is prima facie evidence that
reasonable minds can differ on the proper balancing of the predomi-
nance test. This inconsistency stems from the difficulties in placing a
value on equitable relief. A unity test, on the other hand, avoids these
difficulties.
Under a unity test, the Ticor class' claim does not demand a unitary
adjudication. Although the action can be decided through a single
adjudication, the claim does not call for a single verdict. Separate ac-
189. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
190. See In re Real Estate and Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 1986-iTrade Cas.
(CCH) 67,149 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
191. Id.
192. In re Real Estate Title and Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 815 F.2d 695 (3d
Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 909 (1988).
193. Brown v. licor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992); see also, Laurie
Davison et al., Supreme Court Term 1993-94: Decisions Affecting Access to Federal
Courts, 28 Clearinghouse Rev. 510, 513 (1994) ("Ticor has one immediate repercus-
sion. It leaves intact in the Ninth Circuit-the largest circuit in the country-the rule
that due process requires an opportunity to opt out when the damages sought in a
Rule 23(b)(2) class action are 'substantial.' ").
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tions could have been pursued without creating inconsistent verdicts
or different standards of conduct that the defendant would be unable
to satisfy. Even if an injunction were granted against Ticor's alleged
price fixing, such a remedy need not bind all class members. If un-
named class members excluded themselves from the injunctive relief,
Ticor, at worst, would have to issue title insurance policies under dif-
ferent terms to excluded class members. The issuance of such policies
does not amount to facing incompatible standards of conduct. Ticor is
not in the position of the NFL in White, where the league is obligated
to employ its players under like terms, or Armour and AFC in Jansen,
where the companies must distribute the pension fund evenly. Ticor,
rather, is offering title insurance to consumers, essentially an arms-
length business transaction where there is no relationship between the
parties that would require a single adjudication binding on all pur-
chasers of title insurance.
Additionally, as the Ninth Circuit concluded, the Ticor litigation
suffered from due process deficiencies. The due process problem,
however, arose not because the class sought "substantial" damages,'194
but because the class lacked unity. The only aspect the class members
had in common was the claim-a characteristic of a (b)(3) class.'95
There was no ongoing relationship among class members, as in White
and Jansen, to help ensure that the representative parties adequately
represented the class and thereby satisfy due process to all. There-
fore, because the class members should have been afforded an opt-out
opportunity to pursue individual litigations, certification under (b)(1)
and (2) was improper. Whereas the predominance test creates incon-
sistencies, a unity test provides a sounder guideline for the certifica-
tion of classes and adequately addresses due process concerns through
Rule 23's certification requirements.
CONCLUSION
The class action is an equitable device, and Rule 23 provides a
mechanism for classes to obtain relief, both equitable and monetary.
If a court uses the unity test proposed above when certifying classes,
the goals of finality, consistency, and judicial economy will be met. In
Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) actions, due process will be satisfied through
adequate representation, thereby avoiding the need for notice and
opt-out rights. The class action's purpose of creating a device
whereby large numbers of individuals who are similarly situated can
resolve disputes in a single adjudication will be achieved. In the spirit
of the class-action device, the class and the claim will be the primary
focus, rather than the relief requested. Classes that demand an adju-
dication that includes both equitable relief and money damages can be
194. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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properly certified under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), and would not be
required to be certified under Rule 23(b)(3), as the Supreme Court
implied in Ticor. Thus, suits that require a single adjudication and
demand equitable and monetary relief could find resolution.

